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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE “BUNDLES” AND FIRM ACQUISITIVENESS 
ABSTRACT 
Research Question/Issue: We explore how the interrelations of governance 
mechanisms (“bundles”) influence a firm’s propensity for corporate acquisitions. 
Focusing on four key internal and external mechanisms, namely board of directors 
monitoring, CEO pay incentives, takeover market discipline and institutional 
investor monitoring, we use a sample of 1,171 completed M&A deals by 799 US 
firms during the period 1998-2015 to test the Substitution vs Complementarity 
Hypotheses. 
Research Findings/Insights: The findings provide, in the main, support for both the 
Substitution and the Complementarity Hypotheses, with several incentives 
alignment, internal and external monitoring mechanisms acting as substitutes and 
complements of each other towards firm acquisitiveness.  
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our results challenge the notion that 
corporate governance mechanisms purely function as independent factors and 
contribute to the configurational perspective of corporate governance. They offer 
new evidence that combinations or “bundles” of firm-level governance mechanisms 
can allow for differing degrees of firm acquisitiveness.  
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Different governance “bundles” will have 
different implications for major strategic decisions such as corporate acquisitions. 
Firms seeking to control or increase acquisition propensity can thus consider 
“equifinal” governance configurations, whereby alternative combinations of 
governance mechanisms can lead to comparable, desired outcomes. 
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Mergers and Acquisitions1 (hereafter referred to as M&A) are among the most significant 
corporate investments employed by firms in the pursuit of growth and shareholder wealth 
creation. Although there is a significant body of research across academic disciplines on the 
determinants of corporate acquisitions, this research has been rather disparate in identifying the 
relative importance of different drivers and how multiple drivers may simultaneously work in 
influencing firm acquisitiveness (Laamanen, 2007; Haleblian et al., 2009). Accordingly, 
Haleblian et al. (2009) emphasise the need for additional evidence on the influence of 
governance mechanisms, such as board structure, executive compensation, and blockholder 
ownership on firm acquisition behaviour. 
Corporate acquisitions represent major and discrete strategic events, but they have also been 
argued to exacerbate the inherent conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers in 
large public firms (Jensen, 1986; Morck et al., 1990; Masulis et al., 2007). M&A, for instance, 
can be the result of managerial self-interest, inconsistent with shareholder value maximisation, 
such as empire building (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Andrade et al., 2001) and employment risk 
reduction (Amihud and Lev, 1981). Acquisition decisions can be the source of a wide 
divergence of interests between shareholders and managers and, therefore, have been 
frequently investigated using the agency theory lens, which is also very popular in governance 
research (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A number of recent studies in the empirical literature 
further supports the notion that corporate acquisitiveness ranks highly in both finance and  
management research agendas in relation to behavioural, decision-making, gender-related and 
personality dimensions (Yim, 2013; Huang and Kisgen, 2013; Jenter and Lewellen, 2015; Shi, 
Hoskisson and Zhang, 2017). Irrespective of their short and long-term outcomes, acquisition 




the M&A framework provides a suitable setting to explore the role of governance in 
influencing corporate investment policy. 
The relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance has long 
been at the centre of governance scholarship. However, the evidence from this prolific research 
has yielded mixed results. For example, studies of the effects of board characteristics (e.g., 
board independence, leadership, structure and so on) and ownership structure on corporate 
financial performance have failed to provide consistent evidence of significant and systematic 
effects (e.g., Dalton et al., 1998; 2007; Deutsch, 2005). The fact that the extant literature has 
produced mixed and inconsistent results is due, at least in part, to the examination of 
governance mechanisms in isolation from each other, without considering their joint effects 
(Oh et al., 2018; García‐Castro et al., 2013; Desender et al., 2016).  
To overcome this shortcoming, a more holistic approach to corporate governance has been 
proposed, by considering a configurational perspective of governance mechanisms. Under this 
configurational perspective, substitutive and/or complementary effects between governance 
mechanisms result in the creation of multiple combinations or “bundles” of such mechanisms 
(Rediker and Seth, 1995) that work effectively together towards specific firm outcomes 
(Aguilera et al., 2012; 2015; Cuomo et al., 2016). According to Rediker and Seth (1995; p. 87), 
‘firm performance depends on the efficiency of a bundle of governance mechanisms (authors’ 
italics)’, which implies that different mechanisms can interact with each other in a complex 
way to influence organizational outcomes. Essentially, it is not unreasonable to expect that 
governance mechanisms will operate jointly and, therefore, organizational outcomes will be 
dependent on the effectiveness of some bundles of governance mechanisms (Aguilera et al., 
2012). Governance practices share a common goal and collectively constitute the 
organizational context for the governance environments, but they do have different 




affected by multiple governance mechanisms, the attention should be on their interactive 
influence and how they might have different effects depending on how they are combined (Oh 
et al., 2018). 
To date there has been limited empirical research into this configurational perspective of 
corporate governance. A growing number of studies have, however, confirmed the validity of 
the bundle approach. For example, Desender et al. (2016) show that, in order to protect their 
interests, shareholder-oriented foreign owners introduce their own practices in the existing 
bundle of governance mechanisms normally found in a stakeholder context withing a certain 
country. Furthermore, using a panel sample of U.S. firms for six years, Oh et al. (2018) find 
that multiple governance mechanisms mainly work as substitutes in influencing Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) and suggest that different combinations of governance 
mechanisms can achieve similar levels of CSR. Additionally, Florackis et al. (2015) employ a 
semi-parametric approach and find that ownership and dividends act as substitute mechanisms 
in reducing agency costs of free-cash-flow, but only in the presence of high debt monitoring. 
Finally, employing a fuzzy set/qualitative comparative approach, García‐Castro et al. (2013) 
reveal that in different national contexts the bundle of governance practices in a firm entails 
relationships that are not necessarily monotonic and cumulative; they, thus, conclude that there 
are multiple bundles that can lead to superior organizational performance.  
Drawing from this theoretical approach, the main objective of this study is, consequently, 
to address the aforementioned gaps both in the M&A and corporate governance literatures and 
explore the interrelations of certain firm-specific governance mechanisms with respect to 
influencing a firm’s propensity to undertake corporate acquisitions. By deploying the 
‘complement versus substitute framework’ (Oh et al., 2018; p. 2717), we apply the concept of 
marginal effect to gauge if multiple governance mechanisms operate as complements or 




Given the multifaceted nature of corporate governance, this study focusses on four key 
governance mechanisms, namely board monitoring, CEO pay incentives, external market 
discipline and institutional investor monitoring. M&A are complex corporate investments with 
highly uncertain outcomes and can have major valuation effects for the acquirer’s shareholders. 
Thus, as acquisition decisions require board approval, studying the impact of board monitoring 
characteristics on a firm’s acquisition propensity is particularly salient. In addition, given that 
the CEO of a firm typically initiates an M&A deal, it is interesting to examine the role of CEO 
pay incentives in influencing acquisition decisions as these are important determinants in the 
alignment of governance mechanisms. Moreover, given the increasing importance of 
institutional investor ownership in US public firms (Derrien et al., 2013), these shareholders 
have a vested interest in influencing acquisition decisions and represent another monitoring, 
yet external governance mechanism. 
Using a sample of U.S. firm acquisitions for the period from 1998 to 2015 and drawing from 
the literature on the configurational perspective in corporate governance, we empirically test 
the Substitution vs Complementarity Hypotheses in the context of M&A decisions (e.g., Vives, 
1990). As mentioned earlier, the substitutive assumption (e.g., Zajac and Westphal, 1994; 
Rediker and Seth, 1995; Oh et al., 2018) suggests that one governance mechanism may weaken 
the marginal effects of another mechanism on firm outcomes. This, in turn, implies that 
simultaneously deploying multiple governance mechanisms may not always lead to optimal 
outcomes, as the associated costs of additional mechanisms may exceed their benefits. On the 
contrary, the complementarity view (e.g., Cremers and Nair, 2005; Schepker and Oh, 2013; 
Misangyi and Acharya, 2014) assumes that two (or more) governance mechanisms work in a 
synergistic fashion and that one mechanism could increase the marginal effects of another one. 
If this is the case, two (or more) governance mechanisms need to be simultaneously deployed 




Our empirical results provide support for both the Substitution and Complementarity 
Hypotheses. We find that incentive alignment and external market discipline mechanisms can 
act as substitutes and complements of each other in influencing the likelihood of a firm to 
undertake an acquisition. We also detect complementary effects in the case of board and 
institutional investor monitoring and substitutive effects of institutional investor monitoring 
and external market discipline mechanisms towards acquisition propensity. As such, we make 
several contributions to both the M&A and corporate governance literatures. First, taking into 
account the under-examined interactive effects between different governance mechanisms 
(Cuomo et al., 2016), our results add to the existing M&A literature on the determinants of 
acquisition activity (Aktas et al., 2016) by identifying a set of predictor variables in the form 
of firm-level governance configurations. Furthermore, this study contributes to the 
configurational perspective of corporate governance research (Rediker and Seth, 1995; 
Aguilera et al., 2008; 2012; Ward et al., 2009), suggesting that degrees of firm acquisitiveness 
can be achieved through different combinations or “bundles” of firm-level governance 
mechanisms. In accordance with the idea of “equifinality” (Rediker and Seth, 1995; Gresov 
and Drazin, 1997), firms can be flexible in designing their bundle of governance practices so 
as to achieve predetermined outcomes and, in this case, the desired levels of acquisition 
propensity.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Agency theory-based research generally assumes that firm-level governance mechanisms 
operate independently and, therefore, has predominantly investigated them separately. 
However, as mentioned earlier, this line of research has not been able to establish a definitive 
link between individual governance mechanisms and firm performance (e.g., Dalton et al., 
1998; 2007; Deutsch, 2005). One possible explanation for these contrasting findings is that, 




towards exploring the interconnections between these mechanisms, which essentially means 
treating them as a governance “bundle” (Rediker and Seth, 1995; Aguilera et al., 2008; 2012; 
Ward et al., 2009). 
The Interdependence of Governance Mechanisms 
A growing body within the governance literature has adopted a configurational perspective, 
which posits that firm performance depends on the effectiveness of the “bundle” of governance 
arrangements, rather than the effectiveness of any single governance mechanism (Rediker and 
Seth, 1995; Aguilera et al., 2008; 2012; Ward et al., 2009). The configurational approach in 
corporate governance assumes that in order to achieve a desired firm outcome, the 
interdependencies of governance mechanisms should be considered (Oh et al., 2018). This 
suggests the existence of multiple combinations or “bundles” of governance mechanisms and 
therefore, challenges universalistic policy prescriptions (Aguilera et al., 2008; Cuomo et al., 
2016). Additionally, it supports the notion of “equifinality”, whereby alternative combinations 
of governance mechanisms can lead to similar firm outcomes (Rediker and Seth, 1995; Gresov 
and Drazin, 1997). In these studies focusing on the interdependence of governance 
mechanisms, two alternative hypotheses have been developed, namely the Substitution and 
Complementarity Hypotheses.  
The Substitution Hypothesis 
First, the Substitution Hypothesis predicts that governance mechanisms can substitute one 
another and, in doing so, effectively mitigate agency costs, including considering the costly 
implementation of these mechanisms in a firm (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). This 
assumption has already received robust empirical support. For example, several studies provide 
evidence of substitutive effects between monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms with 




and Goel, 2003; Kim and Lu, 2011) and corporate social responsibility (Oh et al., 2018). In the 
same spirit, other studies find support for the substitutive perspective between various 
monitoring governance mechanisms with regard to outcomes such as firm performance - again 
measured by Tobin’s Q (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) - and the impact on shareholder wealth 
associated with the adoption of antitakeover provisions (Sundaramurthy et al., 1997). 
In the context of this study, our assumption is that the cost-benefit implication of having 
multiple governance mechanisms is a driver of firm acquisitiveness. The substitutive 
perspective implies that if certain governance mechanisms are sufficiently present, the costs of 
implementing additional mechanisms - either monitoring or incentive alignment - may exceed 
the benefits. Therefore, the joint presence of multiple governance mechanisms may not always 
be effective in achieving certain firm outcomes (here acquisitions).  
Consequently, using the marginal effects concept - as employed in the field of economics 
(e.g., Vives, 1990) – we will observe the existence of substitutive effects between two 
governance mechanisms if one governance mechanism decreases the marginal effect of another 
mechanism on firm acquisitiveness. The substitutive perspective implies that if certain 
governance mechanisms are sufficiently present, the costs of implementing additional 
mechanisms - either monitoring or incentives alignment - may exceed the potential benefits. 
Consequently, the simultaneous existence of multiple governance mechanisms may not always 
be optimal in achieving certain firm outcomes and, so, the marginal effect of each mechanism 
will not be strengthened or will even be weakened.  
The Complementarity Hypothesis 
Conversely, the Complementarity Hypothesis posits that the coexistence of multiple firm-
level governance mechanisms is required in order to reduce a firm’s agency costs, which 
implies synergistic effects among governance mechanisms. A recent stream of research 




governance mechanisms, for instance with respect to reducing information asymmetry and 
mitigating agency costs (Rutherford et al., 2007), repealing poison pills (Schepker and Oh, 
2013) and improving firm profitability in terms of ROA (Misangyi and Acharya, 2014). Other 
studies also offer evidence in favour of complementarities between various monitoring 
governance mechanisms. Cremers and Nair (2005), for example, find evidence that shareholder 
activism and the market for corporate control work together as complements towards 
increasing shareholder wealth in terms of long-term equity returns, where annualised abnormal 
returns between 10%-15% are generated only in the presence of high public pension fund 
(blockholder) ownership. Offering further evidence of complementarity effects, Masulis et al. 
(2007) extend the work of Cremers and Nair (2005) by demonstrating that acquirers that face 
more pressure from the market from corporate control, operate in industries with higher 
competition and separate the positions of CEO and chairperson, engage in more profitable 
acquisitions in terms of higher abnormal announcement returns. 
In the specific context of M&A, the complementarity perspective implies that the adoption 
of multiple governance mechanisms would have a greater impact on a firm’s acquisition 
propensity than either governance mechanism in isolation. As suggested by Oh et al. (2018), 
complementarity, therefore, assumes that governance mechanisms work in a synergistic 
fashion and the adoption of certain combinations of governance mechanisms is required to 
maximise their impact on firm outcomes, such as firm acquisitiveness in our case. On the basis 
of the marginal effects concept, two governance mechanisms are complementary when the 
marginal effect of one increases the marginal effect of the other on firm acquisitiveness. 
Governance Bundles and Firm Acquisitiveness 
Traditional agency theory–based assumptions suggest that higher levels of equity based 
compensation should create long-term incentives for managers towards maximising 




compensation as a substantial part of their compensation package are more likely to engage in 
strategic investments such as M&A, which could benefit not only shareholder value in the long-
term but also enhance their personal wealth through these investments. In other words, if the 
CEO believes that undertaking M&A pays off over the long run, firms will be more likely to 
increase their acquisitiveness.  
Since monitoring governance mechanisms, such as the board of directors or the presence of 
institutional investors, are employed in order to reduce managerial opportunism, acquisition 
decisions are expected to receive intensive scrutiny, given also their inherent complexity and 
the potential major long-term consequences on the shareholder wealth of the acquirer. For 
example, the board of directors, as the primary monitoring mechanism in a public firm, is 
involved in the approval (or rejection) of strategic initiatives proposed by the firm’s 
management and is expected to constrain CEO discretion, particularly in cases where the 
proposed M&A may be driven by value-destroying motives, such as hubris (Roll, 1986), 
empire building (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Andrade et al., 2001), and employment risk reduction 
(Amihud and Lev, 1981). Likewise, large and concentrated institutional investors are expected 
to engage in active monitoring and scrutinise the acquisition decisions of their investee firms 
for shared gain. Therefore, monitoring governance mechanisms will be more likely to curb firm 
acquisition propensity.  
With reference to the second governance mechanism, if the positive effect of CEO pay 
incentives (incentive alignment mechanism) on acquisition propensity becomes weaker (i.e. 
has a smaller marginal effect) in the presence of high levels of a monitoring governance 
mechanism, for example in the form of a large or independent board of directors, then this 
would suggest that there is a substitutive effect between CEO pay incentives and board 
monitoring on firm acquisition propensity. In a similar vein, if the negative effect of a strong 




and concentrated institutional shareholders, then this would also suggest that these two 
monitoring mechanisms act as substitutes for each other in reducing firm acquisitiveness. In 
this case, additional monitoring by another monitoring mechanism would not significantly 
affect the firm’s acquisition decision because monitoring by one mechanism would be 
sufficient. If, on the other hand, the negative effect of a strong board of directors increases in 
magnitude (i.e. has a greater marginal effect) concurrently with the presence of a high level of 
institutional ownership concentration (compared to when there is a low level of institutional 
ownership concentration), then this would imply a complementary effect between the two 
monitoring mechanisms.  
Finally, the two conflicting hypotheses (Substitution vs Complementarity) suggest that 
governance “bundles” will likely operate in different ways towards influencing firm outcomes. 
Given that extant research has not provided a uniform answer as yet, the synergies (or not) are 
dependent on the types of governance mechanisms investigated and the exploratory nature of 
the study, our main research question is, therefore, formulated as follows: “To what extent do 
firm-level governance mechanisms operate in a substitutive and/or a complementary fashion 
in influencing firm acquisitiveness?” 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data and Sample Selection 
The initial sample of this study comprises the whole population of US public firms from 
Compustat Fundamentals Annual from 1997 through 2014. We collect the data on board of 
director characteristics and firm anti-takeover provisions from ISS (formerly known as 
RiskMetrics and IRRC before that), CEO compensation data from ExecuComp and 
institutional ownership data from Thomson Financial 13F. The above merging process results 




data for US public acquirers from Thomson One Banker with domestic deals that took place 
between January 1, 1998, and December 31, 20152.  
We then match the two samples to identify both acquirers and non-acquirers. Following 
previous studies, we exclude all financials (SIC 6000–6999) and utilities (SIC 4900–4999). 
Finally, all firms must have complete data on the variables used in the empirical analysis. The 
above procedure resulted in an unbalanced panel3 of 1,639 unique firms with 11,418 firm-year 
observations. Within this sample, there are 1,171 completed M&A deals by 799 acquirers 
during the 1998-2015 period. 
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
In order to measure M&A activity, we use a continuous variable which is the sum of the 
completed acquisition deal values in a given year scaled by the acquirer's total assets in the 
previous year as in Pan et al. (2016). 
Independent Variables 
The main variables of interest are proxies for board monitoring, CEO pay incentives, 
institutional investor monitoring, and monitoring by the takeover market. Firstly, board 
monitoring is proxied by three variables (previously discussed) which have been associated 
with the monitoring effectiveness of the board (e.g. Linck et al., 2008; Wintoki et al., 2012): 
board size, a refined measure of board independence (non-co-opted independence) and 
CEO/Chair duality. Board size equals the number of directors on the board. Non-co-opted 
independence is measured as the fraction of directors who are independent and were appointed 
before the CEO assumed office, as in Coles et al. (2014). Non-co-opted independence has been 
shown to increase the monitoring effectiveness of the board with regard to certain CEO features 




or delta) and firm decisions (capital expenditure) (Coles et al., 2014). CEO/Chair duality is a 
binary variable which is equal to one if the CEO serves also as the Chairman of the board.  
Secondly, we employ CEO vega and delta as proxies for CEO pay incentives. These 
variables are estimated following the approximation method developed by Core and Guay 
(2002), which uses the Black and Scholes (1973) model, allowing for dividends. CEO vega, 
otherwise termed as pay-risk sensitivity, is the dollar change in the portfolio of options of the 
CEO for a 1% change in the annual standard deviation of stock returns at the fiscal year-end. 
In line with Guay (1999), the vega of the equity portfolio is assumed to be zero, so only the 
vega of the options portfolio is used. CEO delta (or the pay-performance sensitivity) is the 
dollar change in the portfolio of equity and options holdings of the CEO for a 1% change in 
the stock price at the fiscal year-end. Delta is calculated as the sum of the deltas of the stock 
and options portfolios. Furthermore, the CEO vega and delta are scaled by cash compensation 
(Graham and Rogers, 2002; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; King et al., 2016), since pay 
incentives are correlated with firm size and are also highly correlated between them. Scaling 
the incentives measures also allows us to include both vega and delta in a single model and 
consider differences in their magnitude. In addition to CEO pay incentives, we include CEO 
cash pay, the fixed component in the compensation associated with CEO risk aversion. CEO 
cash pay is calculated as the natural log transformation of the total CEO pay in the form of cash 
compensation (salary and bonus). 
Institutional ownership entails the third monitoring governance mechanism employed. 
Given the heterogeneous preferences and objectives of institutional investors, we employ 
institutional ownership concentration - expressed as the percentage of the sum of shareholdings 
by the five largest institutional investors to the total shares outstanding at the fiscal year-end - 
as a suitable proxy for the monitoring incentives of institutional investors following, amongst 




Institutional investors with large shareholdings are expected to have much stronger incentives 
to monitor and influence acquisition decisions because the M&A outcome can significantly 
affect shareholder value.  
Finally, we include a proxy for the external discipline imposed by the takeover market, 
namely the entrenchment index (E-Index), proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2009). The E-Index is 
based on six anti-takeover provisions (staggered boards, limits on amending the charter, limits 
on amending bylaws, supermajority requirements to approve a merger, poison pills, and golden 
parachutes) that limit shareholder rights and insulate managers from the pressure of the 
takeover market. The presence of anti-takeover provisions makes firms less vulnerable to 
takeovers and thus more likely to lead to managerial entrenchment and facilitate the display of 
opportunistic behaviour by managers (Masulis et al., 2007). Each firm is assigned a score, from 
0 to 6, based on the number of anti-takeover provisions that the firm has in the given year. The 
higher the E-Index value the higher the probability of managerial entrenchment in the firm 
(Bebchuk et al., 2009). With respect to acquisition activity, Gompers et al. (2003) provide 
empirical evidence that firms with weaker shareholder rights or many anti-takeover provisions 
tend to be more acquisitive.  
Control Variables 
Following the extant literature, to control for other factors that potentially influence a firm’s 
decision to undertake an acquisition, we include a variety of control variables in all model 
specifications. In particular, we include three sets of determinants focusing on firm, industry 
and CEO-specific characteristics.  
In terms of firm-level variables, we control for firm size. Large firms have been shown to 
undertake more acquisitions (e.g. Harford, 1999). Next, we control for book leverage, since 
excessive leverage may pose constraints on a firm’s ability to acquire and thus may decrease a 




effect between overleverage and acquisition probability. Previous studies on acquisitiveness 
(e.g. Levi et al., 2010; 2014) also control for a firm’s sales growth. We additional include 
Market-to-book ratio to account for the effect of growth opportunities and Cash flows as in 
Croci and Petmezas (2015). High levels of free cash flows enable firms to undertake 
investments, hence increasing acquisition propensity (Bauguess and Stegemoller, 2008). 
Furthermore, firms with excess cash reserves are more likely to carry out acquisitions (Jensen, 
1986). To measure cash reserves, we include cash holdings. We also control for accounting 
performance using the firm’s ROA (Sauerwald et al., 2016), and CAPEX (Bauguess and 
Stegemoller, 2008) as a proxy for the scope of managerial discretion in undertaking corporate 
investments. With regard to the industry characteristics which may have an impact on the 
acquisition likelihood, we add the M&A Liquidity Index, since there is evidence of a positive 
association between this variable and the likelihood of an acquisition (Uysal, 2011).  
The last group of control variables refers to certain CEO characteristics which have been linked 
with acquisitiveness. We control for CEO tenure as a proxy for CEO power and entrenchment 
(Berger et al., 1997; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001) which may increase acquisition 
likelihood. Additionally, we include the age and gender of the CEO, two proxies of CEO risk 
aversion. Using a US sample, Yim (2013) reports a negative relationship between CEO age 
and acquisition propensity, with younger CEOs pursuing more acquisitions. With respect to 
CEO gender, there is evidence that, due to female risk aversion and male overconfidence 
(Barber and Odean, 2001; Croson and Gneezy, 2009), female directors and executives 
undertake fewer acquisitions than their male counterparts (Huang and Kisgen, 2013; Levi et 
al., 2014). We also control for CEO overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2008) under the 
assumption that overconfident CEOs will be more acquisitive, especially in firms with 
abundant cash reserves. Risk aversion and under-diversification are expected to induce CEOs 




profit (Hall and Murphy, 2002). As in Croci and Petmezas (2015), we construct CEO 
overconfidence using the options-based measure developed by Campbell et al. (2011). As a 
final CEO characteristic, we control for CEO ownership although its effect on acquisition 
decisions is theoretically unclear. While incentives alignment mechanisms such as CEO equity 
ownership may encourage acquisitions with the objective of shareholder wealth creation, 
undiversified CEOs may forego risky but value-increasing projects such as acquisitions (Coles 
et al., 2006). 
To alleviate potential endogeneity concerns, all explanatory variables are lagged by one year 
with regard to the dependent variable. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% level 
in both tails to mitigate the influence of outliers on our results.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the main analysis. Table 
A2 in the Appendix provides detailed definitions of all the variables. In line with Pan et al. 
(2016), Panel A shows that the average rate of M&A activity is 2.5% (median 0%). Panel B 
focuses on the statistics of the independent variables. The average board of directors consists 
of 9 members, of which 36% are independent outsiders non-co-opted by the CEO, suggesting 
that roughly a third of the board consists of directors who are more likely to be truly 
independent, thus acting as more effective monitors. These values compare favourably with 
those reported by Coles et al. (2014). In about 60% of the sample firms, the CEO is also the 
firm’s Chair. Concerning the CEO pay incentive structure, we observe that the pay incentives 
scaled by cash compensation vary considerably in our sample. For example, the median vega 
(delta) scaled is around 8% (25%) against a mean value of 13% (83%). There is also noticeable 
institutional ownership concentration in the sample firms; the average holdings of the top five 
institutions in a firm is 29%. For comparison, the equivalent number is approximately 25% in 




Moving onto the summary statistics of the firm and industry characteristics, as shown in 
Panel C, the average firm has total assets of $7.6 billion, book leverage of 22.1%, sales growth 
of 9.4%, market-to-book ratio of 2.05, cash flows of 8.9%, cash holdings of 14.7%, ROA of 
4.9% and capital expenditures of 5.3%. These firm-level variables are largely in line with those 
reported in prior studies examining the impact of various governance or director characteristics 
on firm acquisitiveness (e.g. Levi et al., 2014; Croci and Petmezas, 2015). At the industry level, 
the mean M&A liquidity index is 0.015 and median 0.005. These figures are comparable to 
those in Uysal (2011).  
Regarding the CEO characteristics, as reported in Panel D, the average tenure of the CEO 
is 7.7 years, the average CEO age is approximately 56 years old and the CEO owns on average 
1.8% of the firm’s common stock, confirming previous literature (e.g., Andreou et al., 2017; 
Aktas et al., 2019). Furthermore, only a few firms have a female CEO (2.5%) and 18.9% of 
CEOs are overconfident on average. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
As we deploy a relatively large number of corporate governance mechanisms (board 
monitoring, CEO pay incentives, institutional investor monitoring, and monitoring by the 
takeover market)  caution needs to be exercised throughout the empirical analysis, especially 
with respect to the chance of multicollinearity. Table 2 illustrates all pairwise correlations along 
with Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) of all the independent and control variables employed in 
the analysis. While a number of pairwise correlations appears significant, the VIFs of all the 
key governance variables of interest rest between 1.18 (for E-Index) and 1.64 (for Board Size), 
and well below the critical value of 4 (all tolerance scores >0.2).  
------------------------------------ 







We investigate the influences of the four key corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. board 
of directors’ characteristics, CEO pay incentives, institutional ownership concentration and 
monitoring by the takeover market) in an exploratory way so as to identify which, if any, of 
these mechanisms act in a substitutive or complementary fashion with each other. We test the 
substitutive/complementary effects of these mechanisms on firm acquisitiveness by including 
in our specifications all pairwise two-way interaction terms by introducing product terms, and 
examining the marginal effect of one mechanism on acquisitiveness depending on the levels of 
the other for the significant interaction terms. For the purposes of this study, two governance 
mechanisms interact as complements (substitutes) if the marginal effect of one governance 
mechanism on firm acquisitiveness increases (decreases) as the other governance mechanism 
increases (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Siggelkow, 2002). The aforementioned approach has been 
employed, for instance, by studies exploring interactive relationships between governance 
mechanisms in promoting a firm’s corporate social responsibility (Oh et al., 2018). 
Interaction effects are tested via hierarchical moderated regression analysis (Elbanna and 
Child, 2007) in two steps: in the first step, which represents the baseline model, only the main 
effects of the four governance mechanisms of interest are included. In the second step, the 
product terms are entered in a hierarchical manner, by adding each interaction term with the 
associated main effects in a separate model. In each case, a significant increase in R2 from the 
baseline model (by means of an F-test, i.e. the ratio of the variance explained only by the 
interaction term to the unexplained variance in the full model) is attributed to the interaction 
term included in that model.  
To further examine significant interactions, we conduct simple slope tests (Aiken et al., 
1991; Cohen et al., 2003) and calculate the marginal effects of one governance mechanism on 




explore how governance mechanisms interact with each other across different levels towards 
acquisition propensity. Simple slopes are the sensitivity of the dependent variable on an 
independent variable at particular values of the moderator variable.  
For the baseline specification we employ a pooled OLS regression model and we proceed 
with investigating the interactive relationships between the governance mechanisms of interest. 
Accordingly, the baseline model before including the two-way interaction terms is:  
 
𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽3𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽4𝑉𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽5𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽8𝐸𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
+  ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1)  + ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1)  




Subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑡 denote firm and year, respectively. The dependent variable 𝑀&𝐴 is the rate 
of M&A activity. The main explanatory variables are defined as above, where 𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 stands 
for board size, 𝑁𝐶𝐼 stands for non-co-opted independence, 𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 stands for CEO/Chair 
duality, 𝑉𝐸𝐺𝐴 stands for CEO vega, 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑇𝐴 stands for CEO delta, 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 stands for CEO cash 
pay, 𝐼𝑂𝐶 stands for institutional ownership concentration and 𝐸𝐼𝑁𝐷 stands for E-
Index.  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠  and 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 are vectors of all the firm and CEO control variables 
respectively, as previously described. 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖  represent year and industry fixed 








We begin our analysis by reporting the results of the baseline model, which includes only 
the main effects of the four governance mechanisms of interest. Then, we augment the baseline 
specification by introducing two-way interaction terms between heterogeneous governance 
mechanisms. All model specifications include calendar year and industry dummies (not 
displayed for brevity), as it has been shown that acquisitions occur in waves and are industry-
clustered (e.g., Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Harford, 2005). We cluster robust standard errors 
at the firm level in all regressions to control for heteroscedasticity and within-firm correlation 
of residuals (Petersen, 2009).   
To investigate the interplay of governance mechanisms on acquisition propensity, as 
explained we perform an interaction analysis (see Table 3). We explore all possible two-way 
interaction terms between the main explanatory variables. For brevity, we only present the 
significant pair-wise interaction terms in Models 2-64. Figures 1-4 illustrate the significant 
interactions. We also report mean VIFs for all the estimated models in Table 3. All the mean 
VIF values are lower than 4, suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue in our models. 
Model 1 in Table 3 reports the estimates of the first-order terms for the firm fixed effects 
model. All governance and control variables are included as main effects. We mean-centre all 
continuous regressors, before computing their product terms. Models 2 through 6 present the 
significant interactions of the governance mechanisms investigated on acquisitiveness. To plot 
interaction effects, we use the maximum (high) and minimum (low) values of the two 
governance mechanisms considered each time while holding all other covariates at their mean 
values. 
With respect to the control variables, our findings corroborate previous studies (Bauguess 




activity is significantly and positively related to sales growth, market-to-book ratio, and cash 
holdings. As expected, firms with a more active market for corporate control in their industry, 
as proxied by the M&A liquidity index, exhibit higher M&A activity. In contrast, firms are less 
acquisitive when they have higher capital expenditures, and when their CEOs are older and 
have higher stock ownership. 
In Model 2, the interaction term of two monitoring mechanisms (NCI × IOC) is negative 
and significant (ΔR2 = 0.0004, p < 0.05). The simple slope test suggests that the relationship 
between non-co-opted independence and M&A activity is significant when institutional 
ownership concentration is both low (simple slope = 0.019, p < 0.10) and high (simple slope = 
-0.019, p < 0.10). Figure 1 displays this finding. Thus, the presence of high non-co-opted 
independence on its own is not sufficient to constrain acquisitiveness. But, in the presence of 
highly concentrated institutional holdings, these two monitoring mechanisms work together 
and interact as complements in curbing acquisitiveness. This finding therefore lends support to 
the Complementarity Hypothesis. 
In Model 3, we find a positive and significant interaction between CEO delta and E-Index 
(ΔR2 = 0.0006, p < 0.10). As shown in Figure 2, the simple slope test indicates that the 
relationship between CEO delta and M&A activity is not significant when E-Index is low 
(simple slope = -0.001, n.s.) but it is significant when E-Index is high (simple slope = 0.004, p 
< 0.05). This result therefore suggests that M&A activity increases with CEO delta, but only 
in the presence of a higher E-Index (i.e. weaker shareholder rights or more anti-takeover 
provisions and thus weaker monitoring by the takeover market). Otherwise, in the presence of 
a lower E-Index (i.e. stronger shareholder rights or fewer anti-takeover provisions), CEO delta 
has a rather neutral effect on acquisitiveness (the slope is ‘flat’). We, therefore, conclude that 
there are complementary effects between CEO pay incentives – in the form of CEO delta – and 




In Model 4, there is a negative and significant interaction between CEO cash pay and E-
Index (ΔR2 = 0.0004, p < 0.10). A simple slope test suggests that the relationship between CEO 
cash pay and M&A activity is significant when E-Index is low (simple slope = 0.009, p < 0.05) 
but not significant when E-Index is high (simple slope = -0.005, n.s.). As shown in Figure 3, 
the results suggest that the presence of a low E-Index (i.e. strong shareholder rights or few anti-
takeover provisions) in a firm, which has been associated with a better ability of the takeover 
market to exercise control over incumbent managers, increasing CEO cash pay is, in fact, more 
effective in encouraging the CEO to make risky strategic decisions in the form of undertaking 
acquisition investments. This finding supports the Substitution Hypothesis. 
In Model 5, the interaction between institutional ownership concentration (IOC) and E-
Index is negative and significant (ΔR2 = 0.0004, p < 0.10). As portrayed in Figure 4, simple 
slope test suggests that the effect of institutional ownership concentration on M&A activity is 
not significant when E-Index is low (simple slope = 0.050, n.s.) but it is significant when E-
Index is high (simple slope = -0.061, p < 0.05). The presence of a high E-Index (i.e. weak 
shareholder rights or many anti-takeover provisions) in a firm suggests that managers are more 
insulated from the disciplinary power of the takeover market and are more likely to engage in 
acquisitions. In this case, the concurrent presence of highly concentrated institutional 
shareholdings is necessary in order to constrain firm acquisitiveness. This finding supports the 
Substitution Hypothesis. 
Finally, in Model 6 we present together all the interactions found significant individually. 
Coefficients on three of the interactions remain negative and significant (NCI × IOC, CEO cash 
pay × E-Index, and IOC × E-Index), while the positive coefficient on CEO delta × E-Index 
becomes statistically insignificant. Thus, in this full model specification, the overall results we 




results of the interaction analysis provide support for both the Substitution and 
Complementarity Hypotheses between governance mechanisms in the M&A setting. 
 
------------------------------------ 








A potential concern with the interpretation of our main results is that the relationship 
between M&A activity and firm-level governance mechanisms is likely to be endogenous as 
firm acquisitiveness and corporate governance can be jointly determined (due to simultaneity 
or reverse causality issue). In the analysis, we lagged all independent variables by one year as 
a step towards addressing the reverse causality issue, but we acknowledge that this does not 
completely address the issue. Unobserved factors correlated with both acquisition decisions 
and corporate governance structure could bias our results. For instance, M&A activity is 
strongly associated firm-level characteristics, such as corporate culture and strategy which are 
difficult to obtain or measure. As a result, some firms may be more inclined to undertake 
acquisitions than others because of their own unobserved specificities. Fixed effects models 
allow for any correlation between firm-specific effects (unobserved firm heterogeneity) and 
the included regressors in the model. Thus, we include firm fixed effects in our regressions as 
a way to address omitted variable bias from omitted variables which are time-invariant, firm-
specific and unobservable. 
To further mitigate unobserved heterogeneity in our estimates of the interactive effects of 
governance mechanisms on firm acquisitiveness, we incorporate CEO fixed effects combined 




invariant during the tenure of a particular CEO. Prior research has documented that managerial 
fixed effects affect a wide range of firm practices including investment and financial policies, 
as well as other organisational strategy variables. In particular, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) 
report considerable differences in corporate decision-making when taking into account 
manager effects and provide empirical evidence that specific “styles” in managerial decision-
making represent an important source of unexplained variation in several corporate practices. 
As such, a firm/board may determine the need to expand (refocus) and therefore decide to 
appoint a new CEO, who is more (less) aggressive or more (less) prone to engage in expansion 
strategies, such as acquisitions. In the same vein, Weisbach (1995) reveals a relationship 
between management turnover and an increased probability of divesting unprofitable 
acquisitions. It is therefore clear that differences across managers account for much of the 
unexplained variation in several corporate practices, including acquisition policies. In our case, 
a CEO who is the principal decision maker within the firm may have a particular acquisition 
“style” that can correlate with firm-level governance mechanisms and by taking into account 
these specific patterns we can estimate how much of the unexplained variation in acquisition 
decisions can be attributed to CEO fixed effects, after controlling for firm fixed effects and 
time-varying firm characteristics. In our sample, 53% of the 1,639 firms, employ just one CEO 
throughout the sample period, with the remaining 47% employing multiple CEOs. In addition, 
we include acquirer State fixed effects, to control for the potentially unusual flow of 
investments from various US states (i.e. Delaware) and State-level regulatory and judicial 
variations, which may affect outward merger intensity.  
Table 4 reports the estimation results for the main and interaction effects using firm-CEO 
acquirer State, and year fixed effects in the regressions. The estimates of the three significant 
interaction terms found also in the main analysis are qualitatively similar to those reported in 




× E-Index (Model 4) remains negative, it becomes statistically insignificant. One possible 
explanation is that using a more stringent specification that includes firm-CEO fixed effects 
significantly reduces the within firm-CEO variation available for estimation.  
For comparison purposes, we add all the interaction terms together in Model 6. In the full 
model specification, coefficients on NCI × IOC and IOC × E-Index remain negative and 
significant, and the coefficient on CEO cash pay × E-Index remains insignificant as in Model 
4. However, the coefficient on CEO delta × E-Index becomes insignificant.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
To sum up, although we include a variety of fixed effects (firm-CEO, acquirer State, and 
year fixed effects) in order to mitigate endogeneity (reverse causality) concerns and control for 
a wide range of governance, firm, and CEO characteristics to account for observable 
characteristics influencing firm acquisitiveness, our results should be interpreted with caution 
as we cannot completely rule out other unobservable factors that could still be driving the 
explored relationships. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Building on the governance bundle assumption, this paper examines the interactive effects 
of firm-level governance mechanisms and whether they act as substitutes or complements of 
each other in influencing firm acquisitiveness. Departing from the traditional view of the 
independent effects of corporate governance mechanisms, we contribute to the governance 
literature by delving into the interdependencies between corporate governance mechanisms and 
how these influence a firm’s acquisition propensity. In this regard, our study contributes to the 
nascent but highly promising body of governance research which adopts a configurational 




combinations or “bundles” of corporate governance practices, rather than on the effectiveness 
of any single governance mechanism (Rediker and Seth, 1995; Aguilera et al., 2008; 2012; 
Ward et al., 2009). 
In sum, our results mainly provide support for both the Substitution and Complementarity 
Hypotheses when focusing on the interdependence of four key governance mechanisms (board 
monitoring, CEO pay incentives, external market and institutional investor monitoring) in the 
M&A setting. Specifically, we detected significant complementary and substitutive effects 
between incentives alignment and external market discipline mechanisms (i.e. CEO delta and 
cash pay and antitakeover provisions) with respect to influencing the propensity of a firm to 
undertake an acquisition. These results suggest that CEO pay incentives, in the form of delta, 
are more effective in encouraging high-risk projects such as acquisitions when the CEO is 
insulated from the pressures of the takeover market, while cash compensation is more effective 
in the presence of high levels of market discipline mechanisms. Likewise, when there are high 
levels of monitoring mechanisms in place, either in the form of a more vigilant board of non-
co-opted directors or concentrated institutional investors, these mechanisms are 
complementary in constraining CEO discretion and, in doing so, minimise agency costs by 
weakening the positive effect of compensation-alignment mechanisms on acquisition 
propensity. Another noteworthy finding, offering support to the Substitution Hypothesis, was 
also that in the presence of a high E-Index, where managers can feel insulated from the takeover 
market and are more likely to engage in risky investment decisions, a high concentration of 
institutional shareholders can constrain firm acquisitiveness. Results were robust to the 
inclusion of CEO-firm and acquirer State-level fixed effects, after controlling for firm fixed 





Theoretical and Practical Implications 
Our study provides valuable insights for both academics and practitioners. From a 
theoretical standpoint, our results reinforce the view that corporate governance mechanisms do 
not necessarily function as independent factors, but they operate more effectively if treated as 
a bundle (Rediker and Seth, 1995; Desender et al., 2016; Oh et al., 2018). Given that a firm’s 
governance structure consists of various mechanisms, as stated by proponents of the 
governance “bundles” perspective it is important to consider their interrelations in order to 
better explain the effects of combinations (presence/absence) of governance mechanisms on 
firm decisions and outcomes. It is thus possible that one mechanism is more efficient than 
another one in producing a certain outcome, or that one mechanism would not be sufficient in 
the absence of another one. For these reasons, the line of investigation that focuses on the 
substitutive and complementary relationships between governance mechanisms has attracted 
considerable scholarly attention in corporate governance research (Aguilera et al., 2012; 
Schiehll et al., 2014; Cuomo et al., 2016). Our results provide a better and more nuanced 
understanding of how the substitutive and complementary effects of firm-level governance 
mechanisms operate in the context of M&A, specifically in relation to acquisitiveness.  
We extend the validity of the bundles of governance mechanisms approach to the context 
of M&A and present important implications for the design of firm-level governance 
mechanisms. Using the configurational lens, we show that governance mechanisms focusing 
on the incentives alignment (i.e. CEO cash pay and delta), external market discipline and 
internal and external monitoring functions operate synergistically and, hence, any governance 
configuration in relation to acquisitiveness should not treat them independently (Rediker and 
Seth, 1995). Nevertheless, our findings also reveal the emergence of complementarities 
between relatively dissimilar governance practices such as board monitoring and institutional 




the existence of complementarity between heterogeneous governance practices. From a 
contingency perspective, corporate governance as a system of interconnected elements will 
change depending on how multiple governance practices focused on effective monitoring and 
incentive alignment interrelate in influencing strategic decisions such as M&A propensity 
(Desender et al., 2016). As such, the governance system concept implies that the effectiveness 
of the different mechanisms cannot be considered in isolation but the interdependence between 
them influences acquisitiveness (Oh et al., 2018).  
Moving beyond the M&A setting, it  can be argued that these competing perspectives could 
be prevalent in other firm decisions which require intensive deliberation on behalf of the board 
of directors and other firm-specific governance mechanisms, such as decisions about the CEO 
appointment or other critical capital expenditure projects. Furthermore, our study complements 
and extends prior work on the interdependence of governance mechanisms by investigating 
their interactive effects on firm decisions and outcomes, whilst most of the previous studies in 
this area examined whether one governance mechanism substitutes or complements another 
mechanism (e.g., Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Hartzell and Starks, 
2003). Our study also makes important contributions to the extensive yet fragmented M&A 
research about the antecedents of corporate acquisitions. We provide evidence that firm-level 
governance configurations are a crucial determinant for explaining cross sectional differences 
in the acquisition propensity of firms, ranging from a more prudent to a more aggressive 
acquisition behaviour. Our results demonstrate that firm-level governance mechanisms and 
their interrelations are influential in the acquisition decision. These results may help explain 
discrepancies in the previous M&A literature about the multiple drivers of acquisition decisions 
and how these drivers may operate in conjunction by influencing firm acquisition behaviour 
(Haleblian et al., 2009). Therefore, they serve as an important step in advancing our 




Finally, our study has important practical implications. The findings offer a better 
understanding of how different combinations or “bundles” of firm-level governance 
mechanisms influence a firm’s propensity to undertake acquisitions. While individual 
governance mechanisms - whether intended at monitoring or incentives alignment - aim to 
reduce agency problems from the separation between ownership and control, the way these 
mechanisms “bundle” may have different implications for major strategic decisions such as 
corporate acquisitions. For instance, a firm that wishes to limit its managers in pursuing M&A 
activity will reduce CEO delta if the probability of managerial entrenchment is high or reduce 
CEO cash pay if the risk of entrenchment is low. A similar outcome can be achieved if a firm 
with high institutional ownership controls the number of co-opted board members, thus 
preserving high levels of non-co-opted independence, or if one with low institutional 
concentration appoints more co-opted members on the board. Alternatively, in the presence of 
concentrated institutional ownership, a firm can further limit acquisitiveness if it opts to limit 
shareholder rights and increase anti-takeover provisions. On the other hand, if a firm with low 
institutional ownership aims to increase acquisitiveness, it will seek to control co-opted board 
memberships or alternatively limit shareholder rights and increase anti-takeover provisions. 
Meanwhile a firm with high institutional ownership can opt to increase the representation of 
co-opted members on the board to achieve a similar outcome. Finally, increasing CEO 
incentives such as CEO delta and cash pay can boost the acquisitiveness in the presence of high 
and low levels of antitakeover provisions respectively.    
Taken together, our findings imply that firms should consider different governance 
configurations for different levels of acquisition propensity, in line with the notion of 
“equifinality”, whereby alternative combinations of governance mechanisms can lead to 
similar firm outcomes (Rediker and Seth, 1995; Gresov and Drazin, 1997). For policymakers 




design of governance frameworks different, and equally valid, routes can allow firms to reach 
the same end result. 
Limitations and Future Research 
As customary, it is necessary to acknowledge certain limitations of our study and consider 
avenues for future research. First, we have focused on the board of directors, institutional 
shareholders and the external discipline imposed by the takeover market, namely the 
entrenchment index (E-Index), as monitoring mechanisms and on certain CEO compensation-
alignment mechanisms. Given a plethora of corporate governance mechanisms available to 
firms, future research could examine the interplay of other governance mechanisms in the 
context of acquisition decisions. An interesting avenue for future work would be to examine 
how the compensation of top management teams (TMT) interacts with other governance 
mechanisms in influencing key strategic decisions such as corporate acquisitions. Besides the 
CEO, other executives of the so-called “C-suite” like the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
contribute to the firm’s strategic decision making. Other mechanisms relating to the board of 
directors include, for instance, the presence of board committees, board busyness, board 
diversity, directors’ compensation, and other director characteristics. Importantly, as it is 
widely documented in the M&A and agency literatures, corporate acquisitions are often done 
for reasons other than shareholder-value creation. Therefore, acquisitiveness is certainly not a 
predictor of post-acquisition performance. As corporate governance can play a potentially 
pivotal role on acquisition performance, a further promising research avenue is the examination 
of the influence of governance bundles on the performance of M& A.  
Second, our study used only archival data. Arguably, we have employed more refined 
proxies for our board characteristics than previously used “noisy” measures (e.g., non-co-opted 
board independence vs. conventional measure of board independence-proportion of 




understanding of the underlying team-based and decision-making processes of boards of 
directors. Hence, a fruitful avenue for enquiry would be to delve into the inner workings of 
boardrooms by collecting primary data through questionnaire surveys and interviews of board 
members in order to better capture the effects of board monitoring on acquisition decisions.  
Third, we acknowledge some endogeneity concerns. In a similar context to our study, prior 
research shows that CEO compensation is higher when pursuing M&A that significantly 
increase firm size (e.g. Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Harford and Li, 2007, Chen et al., 2017). 
Moreover, prior research has revealed that institutional investors are more likely to invest in 
large firms (e.g., Sias and Starks, 1997; Gompers and Metrick, 2001). Thus, an increase in firm 
size via M&A may attract a higher level of institutional ownership in that firm. In general, the 
reverse causality issue implies that we could observe different governance structures for more 
acquisitive firms. A widely used approach to address reverse causality is to find an instrumental 
variable, which satisfies two challenging conditions, namely the “relevance” and “exogeneity” 
conditions (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). However, in practice it is very difficult to find valid 
strictly exogenous instruments (Wintoki et al., 2012), especially in the case of studies similar 
to ours where multiple independent variables and their interactions are employed. Furthermore, 
unobserved factors correlated with both acquisition decisions and corporate governance 
structure could introduce bias in our results. M&A activity may be strongly associated with 
firm-level characteristics, such as corporate culture and strategy which are difficult to obtain 
or measure. While we employ a host of fixed effects (firm-CEO, acquirer State, and year fixed 
effects) to mitigate such concerns and account for observable characteristics, our methods 
cannot completely rule out other unobservable factors that may be driving our results. Finally, 
some of the governance bundles that we observe are not strictly exogenous, such that changes 
in one mechanism may also trigger shifts in another. While our approach allows us to examine 




direct conclusions with respect to higher-order (or subsequent) effects, driven by the potentially 
endogenous nature of certain governance mechanisms. We note however that - in the absence 
of a natural experiment - it is extremely challenging to completely rule out remaining 
unobservable characteristics. 
Lastly, we have concentrated exclusively on US firms in order to explore the 
interdependence of firm-level governance mechanisms on acquisition decisions. Thus, our 
findings apply mainly to the Anglo-American or shareholder-oriented governance system. 
More work is therefore needed to reveal if the observed interactive effects between the 
governance mechanisms under investigation hold in international settings, considering cross-
national differences and differences in the national models of corporate governance. Future 
research could offer important contributions by extending the sample to include cross-border 
takeovers and explore how different governance arrangements may interact with one another 
to influence a firm’s foreign market entry or foreign acquisitiveness. For example, this could 
be investigated in countries where the continental or stakeholder-oriented governance model is 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1 Sample descriptive statistics 
The table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the main regression analysis. Panel 
A reports the statistics for the dependent variable M&A activity.  Panel B reports the statistics of the 
independent variables employed in the empirical analysis. Panel C reports the statistics for the firm and 
industry characteristics. Panel D reports the statistics for the CEO characteristics. Variable definitions 
are provided in Table A2 (Appendix). 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  Min. 25th Pctl. Median 75th Pctl. Max. 
Panel A: Dependent variable               
M&A activity 11,418 0.025 0.106 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.787 
Panel B: Independent variables               
Board size 11,418 9.056 2.275 5.000 7.000 9.000 11.000 15.000 
Non-co-opted independence 11,418 0.358 0.271 -0.054 0.111 0.364 0.571 0.900 
CEO/Chair duality  11,418 0.582 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CEO vega (scaled) 11,418 0.134 0.164 0.000 0.031 0.079 0.173 0.932 
CEO delta (scaled) 11,418 0.831 2.261 0.010 0.121 0.254 0.582 17.850 
CEO cash pay 11,418 6.887 0.647 5.298 6.465 6.848 7.244 8.752 
Institutional ownership 
concentration (IOC) 11,418 0.291 0.089 0.089 0.229 0.288 0.348 0.527 
E-Index 11,418 3.130 1.327 0.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 6.000 
Panel C: Firm & Industry characteristics           
Firm size 11,418 7.604 1.496 4.675 6.505 7.470 8.576 11.477 
Book leverage 11,418 0.221 0.166 0.000 0.084 0.213 0.328 0.702 
Sales growth 11,418 0.094 0.203 -0.426 -0.003 0.073 0.162 0.954 
Market-to-book ratio 11,418 2.045 1.244 0.779 1.260 1.656 2.351 7.821 
Cash flows 11,418 0.089 0.065 -0.189 0.059 0.090 0.122 0.263 
Cash holdings 11,418 0.147 0.163 0.001 0.026 0.084 0.211 0.721 
ROA 11,418 0.049 0.090 -0.386 0.023 0.057 0.094 0.268 
CAPEX 11,418 0.053 0.049 0.002 0.021 0.037 0.067 0.274 
M&A liquidity index  11,418 0.015 0.027 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.015 0.186 
Panel D: CEO characteristics               
CEO tenure 11,418 7.713 7.109 0.417 2.667 5.583 10.333 35.333 
CEO age 11,418 55.599 6.725 40.000 51.000 56.000 60.000 73.000 
CEO gender 11,418 0.025 0.155 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CEO overconfidence 11,418 0.189 0.392 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 











Table 2 Correlation Matrix 
The table presents all the pairwise correlations and Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) of the variables used in the main regression analysis. Variable definitions are provided in 
Table A2 (Appendix). Superscripts *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
VIF 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 
1. M&A activity . 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2. Firm size 2.94 -0.02* 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
3. Book leverage 2.22 -0.03*** 0.26*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
4. Sales growth 2.11 0.06*** 0.00 -0.02** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
5. Market-to-book ratio 2.08 0.10*** -0.05*** -0.21*** 0.23*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
6. Cash flows 2.05 0.03*** 0.02** -0.18*** 0.20*** 0.34*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
7. Cash holdings 2.03 0.07*** -0.28*** -0.39*** 0.04*** 0.36*** -0.08*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
8. ROA 1.99 0.04*** 0.12*** -0.20*** 0.21*** 0.38*** 0.66*** 0.00 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
9. CAPEX 1.74 -0.03*** 0.02* 0.05*** 0.11*** 0.03*** 0.28*** -0.21*** 0.07*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
10. M&A liquidity index  1.71 0.14*** -0.08*** -0.07*** 0.07*** 0.20*** -0.01 0.14*** -0.01 -0.05*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
11. Board size 1.64 -0.02** 0.57*** 0.21*** -0.08*** -0.06*** 0.00 -0.31*** 0.07*** -0.01 -0.07*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
12. NCI 1.62 0.00 0.17*** 0.05*** -0.11*** -0.05*** 0.01 -0.11*** 0.04*** -0.05*** -0.06*** 0.17*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . 
13. CEO/Chair duality  1.51 -0.01 0.17*** 0.08*** -0.02** -0.03*** -0.01 -0.12*** 0.03*** -0.01 0.00 0.13*** -0.16*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . 
14. CEO vega (scaled) 1.33 0.00 0.39*** 0.00 -0.02** 0.16*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.11*** -0.09*** 0.00 0.18*** 0.02** 0.08*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . 
15. CEO delta (scaled) 1.32 0.02 0.08*** -0.09*** 0.09*** 0.26*** 0.08*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.04*** 0.03*** -0.02** -0.19*** 0.05*** 0.29*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . 
16. CEO cash pay 1.22 0.01 0.61*** 0.16*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.11*** -0.24*** 0.19*** -0.02** -0.01 0.41*** 0.07*** 0.22*** 0.04*** -0.18*** 1.00 . . . . . . . 
17. IOC 1.21 -0.02** -0.26*** 0.02 -0.05*** -0.14*** -0.06*** 0.06*** -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.25*** 0.03*** -0.08*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.20*** 1.00 . . . . . . 
18. E-Index 1.18 -0.02* -0.01 0.03*** -0.06*** -0.14*** -0.01 -0.06*** 0.00 -0.06*** -0.11*** 0.03*** 0.14*** 0.01 0.03*** -0.13*** -0.06*** 0.16*** 1.00 . . . . . 
19. CEO tenure 1.13 -0.02** -0.10*** -0.06*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.00 0.09*** 0.02 0.02** 0.02** -0.10*** -0.61*** 0.29*** 0.03*** 0.27*** -0.03*** -0.01 -0.07*** 1.00 . . . . 
20. CEO age 1.1 -0.04*** 0.11*** 0.03*** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.02* -0.11*** 0.04*** -0.05*** -0.02** 0.11*** -0.19*** 0.29*** 0.00 0.06*** 0.13*** -0.05*** 0.01 0.41*** 1.00 . . . 
21. CEO gender 1.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04*** -0.02* -0.01 0.00 0.03*** 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02* 0.04*** -0.05*** 0.00 -0.01 -0.02* 0.04*** -0.01 -0.06*** -0.07*** 1.00 . . 
22. CEO overconfidence 1.03 0.01 0.04*** -0.01 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.00 0.08*** 0.00 0.03*** 0.03*** -0.01 0.03*** 0.09*** -0.01 0.07*** -0.03*** 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02** 1.00 . 




Table 3 Interaction effects 
The table reports in Model 1 the main effects of a pooled OLS regression. Models 2-6 present the significant pair-wise interactions between the main governance mechanisms 
examined. The dependent variable is the total deal value of the acquisitions made in a given year scaled by the acquirer's total assets in the previous year. ΔR2 denotes the change 
in R2 from the main effects model (Model 1). ΔF denotes a test of the joint significance of the subset of coefficients that are introduced in each model compared to the main 
effects model (Model 1). Variable definitions are provided in Table A2 (Appendix).  
Year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on calendar year and Fama–French 17 industry classification dummies, respectively. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses. 
Superscripts *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Main Effects  
Expected Sign 
Main Effects Interactions 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Firm size  0.0000 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
  (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)    (0.0013)    
Book leverage  0.0030 0.0032 0.0027 0.0036 0.0025 0.0029 
  (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0079)    (0.0079)    
Sales growth  0.0179*** 0.0180*** 0.0175*** 0.0178*** 0.0177*** 0.0173*** 
  (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067)    (0.0066)    
Market-to-book ratio  0.0041*** 0.0041*** 0.0042*** 0.0041*** 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 
  (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)    (0.0015)    
Cash flows  0.0277 0.0281 0.0287 0.0268 0.0272 0.0275 
  (0.0252) (0.0251) (0.0250) (0.0251) (0.0252)    (0.0249)    
Cash holdings  0.0261*** 0.0263*** 0.0260*** 0.0262*** 0.0264*** 0.0267*** 
  (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095)    (0.0096)    
ROA  0.0116 0.0112 0.0114 0.0115 0.0107 0.0100 
  (0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158)    (0.0158)    
CAPEX  -0.0929*** -0.0934*** -0.0943*** -0.0923*** -0.0912*** -0.0919*** 
  (0.0251) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0251) (0.0250)    (0.0249)    
M&A liquidity index   0.4298*** 0.4298*** 0.4295*** 0.4309*** 0.4315*** 0.4323*** 
  (0.0760) (0.0760) (0.0759) (0.0760) (0.0759)    (0.0759)    
CEO tenure  -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)    (0.0002)    
CEO age  -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0003*   -0.0003*   




  Main Effects  
Expected Sign 
Main Effects Interactions 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
CEO gender  -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0026 -0.0027 
  (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0056)    (0.0057)    
CEO overconfidence  0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006 0.0008 0.0008 
  (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)    (0.0026)    
CEO ownership  -0.0493* -0.0482* -0.0479* -0.0454* -0.0494*   -0.0435 
  (0.0262) (0.0261) (0.0262) (0.0264) (0.0262)    (0.0265)    
Board size +/- -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)    (0.0006)    
Non-co-opted independence (NCI) - 0.0010 0.0015 0.0014 0.0010 0.0009 0.0017 
  (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049)    (0.0050)    
CEO/Chair duality  + 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0003 0.0000 
  (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)    (0.0022)    
CEO vega + -0.0075 -0.0080 -0.0113 -0.0073 -0.0083 -0.0113 
  (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0078) (0.0075) (0.0075)    (0.0078)    
CEO delta +/- 0.0007 0.0008 0.0014 0.0007 0.0008 0.0014 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007)    (0.0009)    
CEO cash pay +/- 0.0025 0.0025 0.0021 0.0015 0.0025 0.0013 
  (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)    (0.0024)    
Institutional ownership concentration (IOC) - -0.0052 -0.0062 -0.0050 -0.0058 -0.0083 -0.0097 
  (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0131)    (0.0131)    
E-Index + 0.0012 0.0012 0.0011 0.0012 0.0011 0.0011 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)    (0.0010)    
NCI × IOC   -0.0869**    -0.0698*   
   (0.0406)                (0.0415)    
CEO delta × E-Index    0.0008*   0.0006 
    (0.0004)               (0.0004)    
CEO cash pay × E-Index     -0.0023*  -0.0022*   
     (0.0012)              (0.0012)    




  Main Effects  
Expected Sign 
Main Effects Interactions 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
IOC × E-Index      -0.0185*   -0.0186*   
      (0.0095)    (0.0098)    
Constant  0.0380*** 0.0380*** 0.0382*** 0.0376*** 0.0384*** 0.0383*** 
  (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097)    (0.0096)    
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations  11,418 11,418 11,418 11,418 11,418 11,418 
R2   0.0358 0.0362 0.0364 0.0362 0.0362 0.0374 
Adjusted R2   0.0313 0.0316 0.0319 0.0316 0.0317 0.0325 
F  4.2726 4.2091 4.2976 4.2237 4.2255 4.0997 
ΔR2 from Model 1  
 0.0004 0.0006 0.0004 0.0004 0.0016 
ΔF from Model 1   4.5841** 3.6184* 3.5035* 3.774* 3.5895*** 
(Prob > F)   (0.032)  (0.057) (0.061) (0.052) (0.006) 






















Figure 1 Complementary effect of non-co-opted 
independence and institutional  
ownership concentration on M&A activity 
 
Figure 2 Complementary effect of CEO delta 
and E-Index on M&A 
  
 
Figure 3 Substitutive effect of CEO cash pay  
and E-Index on M&A activity 
 
 
Figure 4 Substitutive effect of institutional 
ownership concentration  









Table 4 Robustness tests  
The table reports in Model 1 the main effects using firm-CEO, acquirer state and year fixed effects in the regressions. Models 2-6 present the pair-wise 
interactions which were found significant in Table 2. The dependent variable is the total deal value of the acquisitions made in a given year scaled by the 
acquirer's total assets in the previous year. All models include the same firm and CEO characteristics as regressions of Table 3 with the exclusion of CEO 
gender. However, only the regression coefficients on the main governance variables of interest and the related two-way interaction terms are reported for 
brevity. Variable definitions are provided in Table A2 (Appendix). Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses.  
Superscripts *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Main Effects Interactions 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Board size -0.0024** -0.0025** -0.0025** -0.0024** -0.0025**  -0.0026**  
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)    (0.0012)    
Non-co-opted independence (NCI) 0.0081 0.0065 0.0079 0.0081 0.0083 0.0066 
 (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0090)    (0.0091)    
CEO/Chair Duality  0.0122** 0.0123** 0.0115* 0.0122** 0.0122**  0.0115*   
 (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0061)    (0.0060)    
CEO Vega -0.0119 -0.0101 -0.0135 -0.0119 -0.0128 -0.0125 
 (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130)    (0.0131)    
CEO Delta 0.0011 0.0011 0.0015 0.0011 0.0011 0.0015 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017)    (0.0016)    
CEO Cash Pay -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038)    (0.0038)    
Institutional ownership concentration (IOC) 0.0411* 0.0315 0.0425* 0.0410* 0.0393 0.0320 
 (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0239) (0.0242) (0.0241)    (0.0240)    
E-Index -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0015 
 (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022)    (0.0021)    
NCI × IOC  -0.1988***    -0.1952*** 
  (0.0716)                    (0.0716)    
CEO delta × E-Index   0.0015*   0.0015 
   (0.0009)                   (0.0009)    
CEO cash pay × E-Index    -0.0003  0.0007 
    (0.0021)                  (0.0019)    
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  Main Effects Interactions 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
IOC × E-Index     -0.0278**  -0.0225*   
     (0.0135)    (0.0136)    
Constant 0.0060 0.0062 0.0063 0.0060 0.0063 0.0068 
 (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0070)    (0.0069)    
Firm control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-CEO fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 10,700 10,700 10,700 10,700 10,700 10,700 
R2  0.2837 0.2845 0.2846 0.2837 0.2842 0.2857 












Table A1. Non-significant interactions 
The table reports all pair-wise interactions which were found non-significant in Table 3, using year and industry fixed effects in the regressions. The dependent variable is the 
total deal value of the acquisitions made in a given year scaled by the acquirer's total assets in the previous year. All models include the same firm and CEO control variables 
as in the regressions of Table 3. For brevity we report only the regression coefficients on the main governance variables of interest and the related two-way interaction terms. 
Variable definitions are provided in Table A2 (Appendix). Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses. 





































A18    
Board size -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)    
NCI 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010 0.0009 0.0009 0.0011 0.0010 0.0010 0.0009 0.0007 0.0011 0.0010 0.0010 0.0008 0.0011 0.0017 0.0009 0.0009 
 (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0049)    
CEO/Chair duality 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0006 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 
 (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)    
CEO vega -0.0085 -0.0072 -0.0075 -0.0074 -0.0077 -0.0077 -0.0080 -0.0080 -0.0075 -0.0074 -0.0075 -0.0071 -0.0075 -0.0074 -0.0073 -0.0080 -0.0075 -0.0079 
 (0.0077) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0078) (0.0075) (0.0105) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0077) (0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075)    
CEO delta 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0004 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)    
CEO cash pay 0.0025 0.0026 0.0025 0.0025 0.0024 0.0025 0.0020 0.0025 0.0025 0.0009 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0021 0.0022 0.0023 0.0025 0.0025 
 (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)    
IOC -0.0047 -0.0050 -0.0052 -0.0048 -0.0054 -0.0052 -0.0057 -0.0052 -0.0051 -0.0053 -0.0101 -0.0049 -0.0052 -0.0066 -0.0057 -0.0058 -0.0052 -0.0051 
 (0.0132) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0191) (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0135) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133)    
E-Index 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0013 0.0012 0.0011 0.0015 0.0012 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0010)    
Board size × CEO vega  0.0013                  
 (0.0021)                  
Board size × CEO delta  -0.0001                 
  (0.0002)                             
Board size × CEO cash Pay   0.0000                
   (0.0006)                
Board size × IOC    0.0019               
    (0.0054)                           
NCI × CEO vega      -0.0111              
     (0.0203)              
NCI × CEO delta       0.0003             








































A18    
NCI  × CEO cash pay       -0.0066            
       (0.0062)                        
CEO duality × CEO vega        0.0008           
        (0.0113)                       
CEO duality × CEO delta         0.0005          
         (0.0012)                      
CEO duality × CEO cash pay          0.0025         
          (0.0034)         
CEO duality × IOC           0.0086        
           (0.0236)                    
CEO vega × IOC            0.0164       
            (0.0749)                   
CEO delta × IOC             0.0003      
             (0.0068)                  
CEO cash pay × IOC              -0.0273     
              (0.0181)                 
Board size × E-Index               -0.0005    
               (0.0003)                
NCI × E-Index                -0.0045   
                (0.0030)               
CEO duality × E-Index                 -0.0005  
                 (0.0015)              
CEO vega × E-Index                  -0.0035 
                  (0.0043)    
Constant 0.0378*** 0.0381*** 0.0380*** 0.0383*** 0.0379*** 0.0380*** 0.0380*** 0.0380*** 0.0380*** 0.0375*** 0.0381*** 0.0380*** 0.0380*** 0.0375*** 0.0377*** 0.0381*** 0.0379*** 0.0381*** 
 (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097)    
Firm control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 11,418 11,418 11,418 11,418 11,418 11,418 11,418 11,418 11,418 11,418 11,418 11,418 11,418 11,418 11,418 11,418 11,418 11,418 
R2  0.0358 0.0358 0.0358 0.0358 0.0358 0.0358 0.0359 0.0358 0.0358 0.0359 0.0358 0.0358 0.0358 0.0360 0.0360 0.0360 0.0358 0.0358 







Table A2. Variable definitions 
Variables Definition Data source 
Panel A: Dependent variable   
M&A activity It is the sum of the completed acquisition deal values in 
a given year scaled by the acquirer's total assets in the 
previous year. 
Thomson One Banker, 
Compustat 
Panel B: Independent variables    
Board Size The total number of directors on the board. ISS  
Non-co-opted 
independence  
The number of independent directors appointed before 






A dummy variable which takes the value of one if the 




The dollar change in the portfolio of options of the CEO 
for a 1% change in the annual standard deviation of 
stock returns at the fiscal year-end, scaled by CEO cash 






The dollar change in the portfolio of options and equity 
holdings of the CEO for a 1% change in stock price at 
the fiscal year-end, scaled by CEO cash compensation 




CEO cash pay The natural logarithm of the CEO cash compensation 






The percentage of the sum of shareholdings held by the 
five largest institutional investors to the total shares 
outstanding at the fiscal year-end. 
Thomson Financial 13F, 
CRSP 
E-Index The Entrenchment Index of Bebchuk  et al. (2009) 
based on six anti-takeover provisions (staggered 
boards, limits on amending the charter, limits on 
amending bylaws, supermajority requirements to 
approve a merger, poison pills, and golden parachutes). 
Each firm is assigned a score, from 0 to 6, based on the 
number of anti-takeover provisions that the firm has in 
the given year.  
ISS 
Panel C: Firm & Industry characteristics   
Firm size The natural logarithm of the book value of total assets 
in the fiscal year. 
Compustat 
Book leverage The book value of total debt (long-term plus short-term 
debt) divided by the book value of total assets at the 
fiscal year-end.  
Compustat 
Sales growth The ratio of the sales in the current fiscal year to the 




The ratio of the market value of total assets to the book 
value of total assets at the fiscal year-end, where the 
market value of assets is defined as the book value of 
assets plus the market value of common stock minus the 
book value of common stock. 
Compustat 
Cash flows Operating income before depreciation minus income 
taxes minus interest expenses minus dividends 
(common and preferred), divided by the book value of 




Cash holdings Cash and short-term investments, scaled by the book 
value of total assets at the fiscal year-end. 
Compustat 
ROA Net income divided by the book value of total assets at 
the fiscal year-end. 
Compustat 
CAPEX Capital expenditures scaled by the book value of total 




The ratio of the value of all corporate control 
transactions of at least $1 million reported by the 
Thomson One Banker for each Fama–French 49-
industry classification and year to the total book value 
of assets of all Compustat firms in the same Fama–
French 49-industry classification and year. 
Compustat, Thomson One 
Banker 
Panel D: CEO characteristics   
CEO tenure The tenure of the CEO in years at the fiscal year-end. It 
is the difference between the fiscal year-end date and 
the date that the person became CEO. 
ExecuComp 
CEO age The age of the CEO in years at the fiscal year-end. ExecuComp 
CEO gender A dummy variable which takes the value of one if the 




A dummy variable which takes the value of one if the 
CEO is identified as overconfident, and zero otherwise. 
CEOs are overconfident if they delay the exercise of 
vested options which are at least 67% in the money. We 
follow Campbell et al. (2011) in order to calculate the 
average moneyness of the CEO’s option for each 
sample year. First, for each CEO-year, the average 
realisable value per option is calculated by dividing the 
total realisable value of options by the number of 
options held by the CEO. Second, the strike price is 
calculated by subtracting the average realisable value 
per option from the stock price at the end of the fiscal 
year. The average percent moneyness of the options is 
computed by dividing the stock price at the fiscal year-




The shares held by the CEO, excluding options, divided 











1 Henceforth, the terms “mergers” and “acquisitions” are used interchangeably. 
2 Following conventions in the M&A literature, we impose the following standard M&A sample 
selection criteria: (1) the acquirers must be publicly listed and the targets are either public or 
private firms, (2) all exchange offers, leveraged buyouts, repurchases, recapitalisations, 
spinoffs, minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, self-tenders and 
privatisations are excluded, (3) the M&A deal should be completed, (4) the acquirer must control 
less than 50% of the target’s shares prior to the transaction and more than 50% after the deal 
completion, to ensure that transactions included in the sample represent a transfer of control, 
and (5) the deal value must be at least $1 million. These screening criteria yield a sample of 
16,642 completed deals over the specified sample period. 
3 By using an unbalanced panel for a rather long time period (eighteen years), survivorship or 
attrition bias issues are mitigated, since we are able to study companies withdrawn from 
databases for reasons, such as being acquired or delisted.  
4 For the sake of completeness, we provide the results of the non-significant two-way interaction 
terms in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
